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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court of a Memorandum Decision of the District Court 
reviewing the denial of a Motion to Expunge Criminal Records entered by a Magistrate. The 
appeal is filed pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 l(c)(9). A Memorandum Decision was issued 
by the Honorable D. Duff McKee, January 4'", 2008, reviewing an earlier Memorandum Opinion 
and Order issued by the 13onorable Michael Reardon, Magistrate Judge, on December 4"', 2006, 
Notice of Appeal was timely filed therefrom. 
PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The Motion to Expunge Criminal Record was filed July 28"', 2006 in Fourth District 
Magistrate Court. It was supported by an Affidavit of the Defendant, Dr. Gary L. Turpen, which 
recited the essential facts of his earlier trial and acquittal by a jury on June 17Ih, 2004 upon the 
misdemeanor crime of sexual exploitation by a medical care provider. A copy of the Affidavit, 
with exhibits is found in the Clerks Record on Appeal, pages 41 to 46. (Hereinafter R 41-46). 
The State filed no opposing affidavit. The matter was heard upon argument by the Magistrate on 
November 3"', 2006. 
The Defendant cited Judge McKee's earlier decision on appeal in the Fourth District case 
of Rick Koebbe, Plaintiff v. State of Idaho, Defendant, Case No. I30501216 for the proposition 
that an Idaho Magistrate has an inherent equitable power to consider expungement relief. For the 
convenience of the Court and counsel, a copy of the Koebbe decision is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "A". 
The Magistrate Court did not request further briefing, but he did ask the Defendant to 
augment the record with additional information. In response to that request, the Defendant 
provided the Court on November 14th, 2006 with supplemelltal materials, including a letter from 
the Defendant which amplified upon the details of the damages attending his personal and 
professional life attributable to his continuing criminal record. A copy of the Defendant's letter 
is found in the collection of Certified Exhibits to the Record following the Transcript of Motion 
Hearing held, November 3'"', 2006 hereto as Exhibit Item 5, letter. (Hereinafter E5 letter) 
Approximately three weeks later, Magistrate Reardon issued his decision denying the 
expungement sought upon the precedent of the Koebbe case. (R49-50) He held that there was no 
legal basis for granting the relief sought because there was "no showing that the police action 
giving rise to the record was unjustified". Notice of Appeal was filed (R5 1-53) and the record 
was augmented by order of the District Judge by the preparation of the transcript of the original 
trial for his review. Argument on appeal was had before Judge McKee and he issued the lower 
court opinion herein on January 4Ih, 2008 (R63-68) 
STANDARD ON REVIEW 
There are no facts in dispute, as no hearing on the motion was conducted below and the 
State did not contest the Affidavit, Exhibits, or the supplemental materials supplied to the Court. 
The Magistrate did not enter formal findings of fact or conclusions of law. The Magistrate did 
apply the earlier Fourth District decision in ICoebbe to the facts upon the record. (R50) However, 
he did so without taking the additional step which the District Court later did on appeal, of 
obtaining a transcript of the trial proceedings originally held below in the case. This 
augmentation of the record in effect placed the District Court in the position of conducting a trial 
de nova under IRCP 83(b). Accordingly, the District Court did exercise free review over 
questions of law, with no disputed issues of material fact. 
Now this Court should also exercise free review over questions of statutory and case law 
as to the issue of expungement. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796, 102 P3d 1 115 (2004). The 
Appellant also asla the Court to distinguish, broaden or revise the rules of law announced in the 
Koebbe and cases. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant, Gary L. Turpen, is a licensed dentist, holds a Bachelor of Arts degree fiotn 
Brigham Young University and a Doctor of Dental Surgery degree from Baylor College. He did a 
one year residency at the University of Utah Medical Center and has been practicing dentistry in 
Boise since July of 1990. (Certified Exhibit 4 is the transcript of the jury trial held June 15,16, and 
17, 2004. For simplicity, the original transcript pagination is used herein for reference. Trial 
Transcript, page 385, line 6 to page 386, line 21, hereinafter "T385,6-386,21n) He was forty two 
years old, married with one child and active in church, boyscouting, and other service organizations 
in the community in 2004. (Id.) 
On or about January 3 1 '', 2004, Dr. Turpen was arrested and charged with the misdemeanor 
crime of sexual exploitation by a medical care provider under Idaho Code Section 18-919. The case 
was investigated by the Boise City Police Department and reviewed and prosecuted by the Ada 
County Prosecutors Office. Dr. Turpen was briefly detained and fingetprinted and photographed by 
the Ada County Sheriffs Office (R 41) 
The principal complaining witness against Dr. Turpen was one of his patients. Pamela 
Kenney alleged that he had touched her breast two times during the course of a sedated medical 
procedure conducted in his office when his dental assistant briefly left the room. (T 13, 19-15,20) 
Dr. Turpen pled not guilty and received a jury trial on June ISh, 16th, and 17Ih 2004. The Defendant 
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was acquitted when the jury returned a "not guilty" verdict. (R 41,44) 
Even though he was acquitted, Dr. Turpen has suffered damages associated with this high 
profile prosecution and the maintenance of public criminal records associated with the arrest and 
placement of criminal charges. The continued existence of those records constitutes a personal and 
professional embarrassment to him as an "injury of character" which he wished to remedy by the 
filing of this expungement motion. I-Ie has last business, patients, and income because of the arrest 
and the existence of the related records (R 42). In particular, he is unable to attend church services 
at the prison because of background checks. New patient adlnissions are down fifty percent in his 
dental practice. His professional income has dropped by three percent recently instead of growing 
by 9.9 percent as it did from 1998 to 2003 in the six years preceding his arrest. (E5 letter) 
To attempt to mitigate these damages and to exhaust his administrative remedies so far as 
the statutes allow an acquitted Defendant to do so, Dr. Turpen filed a request for administrative 
expungement from the Idaho Department ofLaw Enforcement. He received back ail affirmation that 
they had deleted the entries within their control, pursuant to Idaho Code 67-3004(10). This 
apparently clears Dr. Turpen's criminal history record with the Idaho State Police, the Idaho 
Criminal Identification Bureau and the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the National Crime 
Information Center only. (R41,42,45,46) 
However, other important, easily locateable, and very public records linking Dr. Turpen's 
name with the crime of sexual exploitation ofaminor continue to be maintained. For example, the 
District Court's own register of actions exists for public access on the first floor of the Ada County 
Courthouse contains this criminal history consisting of a three page printout of the detailed history 
of the misdemeanor charge, the trial below and this District Court Appeal, as maintained in the 
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court's own system. (E8) A copy of said document is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Therein, in a 
record which contains 70 dated entries, consumiilg 104 lines of typed information, only one obscure 
line, the third entry from the bottom of the first page, reports "611712004", "Defendant Acquitted". 
By contrast to that, the caption of both the felony and misdemeanor records, at the top of the page 
in capital letters on adjacent lines, links the name "TURPEN, GARY L. D R .  With the phrase 
"SEXUAL, EXPLOITATION. Numerous entries use terms such as "charge", "warrant", "arrested", 
"bond", "testimony", "evidence" and "custody". Every member of the public has instant and 
immediate access to this text through the court's computer terminals. 
To address the ongoing damage created by the continued maintenance of records related to 
a crime for which he has been acquitted, the Defendant filed a motion to expunge his criminal 
records as held by the Fourth District Court, the Boise City Police Department, the Ada County 
Sheriffs Office, and the Ada County Prosecutors Office. (R29-40) In his attempt to obtain that relief, 
the Defendant submitted a proposed Order directed at those entities to the Magistrate and District 
Judge below. (E7 attachment to Respondent's Brief, as Exhibit "E" thereto) In denying the Motion 
to Expunge, both the Magistrate and District Judge McKee declined to issue the Order. Judge 
McICee was familiar with the topic of expunge~nent having been the judge who heard the appeal of 
State v. Koebbe, supra, and having issued the decision attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Mr. Koebbe 
therein was directed to make a showillg that the "proceedings from the outset were unjustified" in 
order to obtain the equitable relief of the Court. He did so and was granted expungement on the 
unique facts of his case. Thus, the Fourth District Court, by Judge McKee has issued two opinions 
in recent months recognizing the inherent authority of a judge in certain circumstances to grant 
expungement, without reference to or preclusion by Idaho statutes. However, in Dr. Turpen's case 
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the relief was denied. This appeal then developed. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. DOES THIS COURT'S RECENT OPINION IN STATE V. PARKINSON PRECLUDE 
THE FINDING OF AN INHERENT JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO EXPUNGE? 
2. SHOULD THE ACQUITTAL AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLE DR. TURPEN TO THE 
EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS IN THIS CASE? 
3. DO THE RULINGS IN THE KOEBBE AND TURPEN CASES ENTITLE DR. TURPEN 
TO THE EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS IN THIS CASE? 
4. SHOU1,D THE RULINGS IN THE KOEBBE AND TURPEN CASE BE MODIFIED OR 
CLARIFIED TO ALLOW THE EXPUNGEMENT OF RECORDS FOR A BROADER CLASS OF 
PROPERLY SITUATED DEFENDANTS? 
5. SHOULD THIS COURT ADOPT THE "BEST" REASONED APPROACH BY USING 
A "BALANCING TEST" FOR COMPARING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERESTS IN 
CONSIDERING SOME EXPUNGMENTS? 
6. IS DR. TURPEN A PROPER APPLICANT FOR EXPUNGEMENT RELIEF UNDER 
A BALANCING TEST? 
A. 
ANALYSIS OF THE TURPEN TRIAL EVIDENCE 
The trial in this matter was an interesting and appropriate exercise in American juris- 
prudence. The Complainant, Pamela Keimney, was sincere and not apparently malicious in making 
allegations about Dr. Turpen's conduct. However, when tested by the scrutiny of a three day jury 
trial, it became apparent to the jury that her perceptions were unreliable, unproven, and poorly 
formed while under the influence of both an anxiety reducing prescription drug, oxazepam, and a 
significant amount of local anesthetic used during the surgery. 
Upon direct examination by the prosecution, Pamela Kenney testified that the oral surgery 
executed by Dr. Turpen "pulled eleven of her teeth" and took "an hour". (T 17,17-21) She testified 
that she took three prescription anxiety pills, a drug called "oxazepam", at 6:30 a.m. prior to her 8 9 0  
a.m. surgical appointment, instead of the five pills she was instructed to take. She took the 
remaining two pills just ten minutes before the scheduled surgery, while she was being driven to t11e 
dental office. (T 7, 13-10,12) Ms. Kenney felt she was "slightly" affected by the medicine. (T 10, 
19-1 1,s) By contrast, her boyfriend Christian Crowell would later testify that when he walked her 
into the office she was "somewl~at groggy" "her equilibrium was off', "she was slurring her speech 
a little", "moving or acting slower" "wasn't completely coherent" and "needed assistance" both 
walking into the ofice and walking back to the room where the procedure was done. 
(T I l3,8-115,25). Afterward, Ms. Kenney was "nloaning", affected in her equilibrium, slurring her 
speech, groggy and had her eyes closed when they left the office. (T 117, 14-1 18,22). 
Upon re-cross examination, even Pamela admitted that she was "drifting" or "dozing" as the 
procedure went on because of the effect of the drugs. (T 88,24-89,23) The oral drugs were 
augmented by a considerable amount of local anesthetic administered by injection to sufficiently 
numb the patient's jaw and gums at all eleven extraction points to preclude sensation of pain. (T 12, 
12-23) 
Thereafter, Ms. Icenney perceived and remembers "two different occasions the assistant 
walking away. And at that point, I remember the blanket being lifted and Dr. Turpen's hand going 
up underneath my jacket and my shirt and grabbing my breasts". (T 13,21-25) That is the allegation 
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upon which the Complaint was filed and the prosecution was based. 
However, upon cross-exa~nination the Complainant's story began to assume a substantially 
different prospective. Because Ms. ICenney did not open her eyes, her testimony about the presence 
or absence of the assistant and the doctor in the room was based on a "sixth sense" of "feeling the 
presence" of the relevant individuals. (T-57,21-69,5) When called to testify, dental assistant Jessie 
Gage contradicted Kenney stating that she left the operatory room only once when Dr. Turpen 
remained behind. (T 178, 17-20 275, 14-18) In contrast to Ms. Kelmey's "sixth sense" testimony, 
the recollection and detail with which Ms. Gage described the entirety of the procedure on a moment 
by moment basis was concise and compelling. Her testimony, utilizing the Kenney medical records 
and photographs, even showed that the operatory was largely open to public view from other rooms, 
hallways, even the reception area of the dental office. (T 224, 17-272,20) 
A further significant conflict developed in Ms. Ke~mey's testimony about the actual type and 
number of the alleged touchings. On the stand she stated that she sensed a single, gentle, quick 
squeeze of her right breast only on each of two occasions. (T 65,3-25 and 72,3-24) However, the 
police report given by Ms. Kenney some two weeks after the incident Exhibit "CC" at the trial 
contained the following paragraph: "When the nurse was gone the first time, Kenney stated she felt 
the blanket lift up and felt a hand grab each of her breasts and gently squeeze each breast. Kenney 
stated this happened twice during the medical procedure." (T 441, 13-442, 12) (emphasis added) 
This meant that she originally felt four, not two touchings. 
Dr. Turpen too reviewed his records and gave detailed testimony from the witness stand. I-Ie 
testified that during the one to two minute period when his assistant left the room on a single 
occasion both his right hand and left hand were fully and professionally engaged holding Ms. 
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Kenney's jaw and a syringe to finish administering anesthetic in the lower jaw. He straightfonvardly 
denied that he touched Pamela Kenney's breast. (Tr 41 1, 1-25) 
After being il~structed by Judge Hurlbutt, hearing the argument of counsel and duly 
conte~nplating the evidence, the jury held the allegatiorls unproved or unfounded. They returned to 
the Courtroom with the acquittal verdict in the hand of the foreman to be read by the Clerk. 
However, even upon this scenario of acquittal, as unbelievable as Ms. Kenney's testimony 
turned out to be, the Defendant does not and can not contend that probable cause did not exist to file 
these charges. There was 110 police misconduct in talting the report and passing it along. There was 
no prosecutorial misjudgment in presenting the matter for screening to a magistrate and the 
magistrate was not without a "probable cause" factual and legal basis to authorize the filing of the 
Complaint which brought Defendant Turpen to the Courthouse and created the records which still 
exist therein. 
Therefore, if the "unjust from the outset" standard articulated in Koebbe is the only basis for 
non-statutory expunge~nent relief in Idaho, neither Dr. Turpen nor any other similarly situated 
acquitted Defendant can ever obtain that relief. 
B. 
THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IN THE KOEBBE CASE 
I11 the decision in Koebbe issued March 29'h, 2006, Judge McKee agreed with the contention 
of that defendant that Idaho trial courts of general jurisdiction have an inherent power to consider 
expungement relief. The Koebbe decision grounds that authority "under the equitable power of the 
court, to right a wrong if such can be established therein". Both Mr. Koebbe then and Dr. Turpen 
subsequently argued that an expungement-oriented injury also has a basis for relief arising from the 
Page -9- 
Idaho Constitution. However, in Koebbe Judge McKee did not either accept, reject or comment 
upon that proposed constitutio~lal argument. 
Instead, the standard announced for proof was a showing "that the police action giving rise 
to the creation of the "record" was unjustified from the outset", and that it "would be unjust and 
inequitable for the "record" to continue". Despite a review of numerous federal and other state 
precedents suggested by Mr. Koebbe, no specific case or treatise was cited by the Court in its text 
as a source of authority for that holding. 
The text of tlie decision and the test in Koebbe was most appropriate to the facts therein. 
However, in the case of Dr. Turpen, a broader view, a more comprehensive test, a id  a wider 
consideration of the authority and the analogy upon which expungement rests was urged upon Judge 
McKee. 
C. 
THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IN THE TURPEN CASE 
In t h e m  decision, from which the appeal herein was taken, Judge McKee confirmed that 
"There is no Idaho statute directly on point and the statutes that do exist do not fit the circumstances 
of this case" (R64). He reconfirmed his opinion that "the courts do have an inherent power to act" 
on expungement. (Id) 
However, he refused to change the tlueshold tlie Koebbe test, requiring a showing that 
"proceedings below were tainted from the onset" (Id) Significantly, yet sadly, Judge McKee did 
broaden the test, but did not articulate precisely the extent of the expansion: 
" . . . .I conclude that the courts do have inherent power to 
correct inequities in more circumstances than the precise 
elements set forth in the Koebbe decision . . . ." (Id) 
I-Iowever, he denied relief to Dr. Turpen because the prosecution was not "wrongly initiated 
or unconstitutional or taken without foundation" and a jury acquittal is not necessarily a finding of 
"innocent", after a fair and untainted trial. (R65-66) Reaffirming his view that no "serious" or 
"extreme" circumstances were shown under this record by Dr. Turpen, the District Court refused to 
overrule the Magistrate and denied expungement. (R66-67) 
In passing, Judge McKee wondered if the showing of damages and impact on Dr. Turpen's 
l i e  was not merely a false logic governed by the Latin phrase "post hac ergo propter hac", meaning 
that since an event followed (damages), it must have been caused by another (court records). (R66) 
In at lease one instance, however, the causal connection between the two is clear, direct and 
uncontestible. Dr. Turpen was denied admission to the Idaho State Penitentiary as a volunteer 
religious leader because of his criminal entry record. He previously was allowed to attend annually. 
(E-5-letter) 
The remaining damages and impacts alleged are natural and logical consequences of the 
maintenance ofsuch records for which other supreme courts have assumed causation and connection 
without requiring expert testimony below. Davidson v. Dill, 503 P2d 157 (Colo. 1972). 
In sum, Judge McKee states in that he or other jurists may find broader, 
circumstances than in I(oebbe to grant inherent expungement relief, but does not define the metes 




THE SUPREME COURT'S RULING IN THE PARKINSON CASE 
This Court recently issued an expungement opinion in State v. Parkinson, 144 Idaho 825,172 
P 3d 1100 (2007). Therein Justice Jones, writing for a unanimous Court, denied a request to purge 
the criminal records of a defendant who had pled guilty, completed probation and approached the 
district court under Idaho Code 19-2604. When the lower court found that it had no jurisdiction 
under that statute to expunge, appeal was taken. This Court found three problems with the suggested 
procedure: 
1. Idaho Code 19-2604 does not expressly require or authorize expungeinent, but 
only allows dismissal of a case if a fully compliant probation is completed. 
2. This statute does not provide authority to take further actions. 
3. A state court has no authority to compel the FBI to make changes to its data base, 
especially since federal courts have no such jurisdiction. Id at 1102-1 104 
Accordingly the Parkinson court concluded: 
"The district court properly held it does without authority 
to expunge Parkinson's record under Idaho Code Section 
19-2604" Id. at 1104. 
ARGUMENT 
THE PARKINSON CASE, FOCUSED SOLELY ON STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 
DOES NOT PRECLUDE THE RECOGNITION IN IDAHO OF A JUDICIAL INHERENT 
POWER 1'0 EXPUNGE CRIMINAL, RECORDS 
Idaho has three statutes which relate to the general concept of clarifying, amending or 
"expunging" criminal records, Idaho Code Section 20-525A permits juveniles over 18 or 5 years 
past their release to seek expungement and grants the court authority to so act after applying a 
defined balancing test, ifthe public safety will not be compromised thereby. Idaho Code Section 67- 
3004 (10) gives administrative relief from the Department of Law Enforcement to ail uncharged or 
acquitted citizen to have fingerprints and histories expunged. Dr. Turpen has already taken 
advantage of this provision to receive partial relief. (R41,42,45,46) 
Parkinson dealt solely with the third such law, Idaho Code Section 19-2604. The Court of 
Appeals has wrongly characterized this as an expungement or partial-expungemenl statute. Housle~ 
v. State, 119 Idaho 855, 811 P2d 495 (1991), State v. Deitz, 120 755,819 P2d 1155 (1991), && 
v. Schumacker, 131 Idaho 484,959, P2d 465 a998)  and State v. Dorn, 140 Idaho 404,94 P3d 709 
(2004). 
In m, Judge Gutienez offers a lengthy dissent which more accurately describes 19-2604 
as "Idaho's discharge of defendant, amendment ofjudgment statute", Id. at 406-409 
111 Parkinson, this Court did draw a distinction between the general term "expungement" and 
the more limited, specific procedure relief allowed under 19-2604 saying that it "does not expressly 
allow expungement". Further, you also did state: 
"Idaho law authorizes no type of expungement of a criminal record 
for adult offenders other than that authorized in Idaho Code 
Section 19-2604". Parkinson, supra at 1102, (emphasis added) 
This statement does not clash with Judge McKee's finding of the existence of an inherent 
judicial authority to expunge, if the phrase "Idaho law" in the above quotation means only "Idaho 
statutes". If it means instead that there is and can be no such authority supplementing the existing 
statutes in the entire body ofconstittitional and case law, the Court should now so say in this case. 
The recognition ofan inherentjudicial power to expunge is not precluded because statutes also exist. 
Absent legislative action, judicial control has been and may be used to supplement and expand 
narrowly draw11 expungement statutes. Davidson, supra, at 162. 
The simplest and most direct reading of the Parkinson opinion suggests that it is a case of 
statutory interpretation only, not designed to address the broader question of whether and to what 
extent a judicial inherent authority to expunge does exist in Idaho. As far as can be determined now 
from the briefs on file and that opinion as written, neither party significantly advanced nor 
challenged this Court to reach a conclusion addressing such an "inherent authority". Under these 
circumstances and by its own text and terms, Parkinson does not preclude Dr. Turpen from seeking 
the relief sought herein. Such an opinion should include validating Judge McKee's finding of an 
inherent judicial authority to expunge, more clearly defining its extent, specifying a test for its 
application and invoking it to Dr. Turpen's benefit. 
11. 
THE FOURTH DISTRICT EXPUNGEMENT RULE, AS FIRST ANNOUNCED IN KOEBBE, 
IS TOO NARROW TO ADDRESS ALL CASES WORTHY OF EXPUNGEMENT 
State of Idaho v. Rick Koebbe was a "false" arrest case. A Garden City police officer had 
wrongly heard or deliberately misstated that the Defendant therein had announced an intention to 
injure the officer by driving his vehicle over the policeman's foot. This alleged probable case for 
a felony arrest was disproved by expert analysis of the officer's own tape recordings made at the 
scene. That expungement request review could therefore focus an analysis solely upon the presence 
or absence of probable cause fro111 the outset of the traffic stop. This led to a narrow and proper 
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articulation of the Fourth District Expungernent Rule as to whether "he police action giving rise to 
the creation of the record was unjustified from the outset". 
This Appellant is unable to find any reported case which used exactly and solely that test for 
proscribing a Court's authority for inherent expungement power. The Brief for the Appellant led in 
the Koebbe case cited or quoted a dozen federal and state expungement cases and two treatises to 
the Court. None of them limits or directs a reviewing Judge in solely this way to the Koebbe test. 
However, the announced FourthDistrict Rule is most similar to aportion ofthe expungement 
rule used in United States v. Robinson, 79 F. 3d 1149, 1996 WL 107129( 6"' Cir. 1996) and other 
federal cases which permitted the invoking of the expungeinent power with respect to "illegal 
convictions, convictions under statutes later deemed unconstitutional and convictions obtained 
through governmental misconduct". This focus has become known as the "extreme circu~nstances 
test". United States v. Pinto, 1 F. 3d 1069, 1070 (loth Cir. 1993). 
However, the extreme circumstances contemplated by this Federal Rule are much broader 
than whether or not an arrest was invalid from the outset. For example, even the Ninth Circuit 
version of the extreme or extraordinary circumsta~~ces rule utilizes a broader balancing of equities 
than merely focusing upon the facts at the outset. In United States v. Smith, 940 F 2d. 935 (9th 
Cir. 1991) the expungement of relatively minor convictions was sought by aDefendant to allow him 
to re-enlist in the military after the successful completion of a five year probation. The Court denied 
the request, but recited inherent power cases that looked at "unconstitutional state convictions", 
"violation(s) of constitutional rights" and "when necessary to preserve basic legal rights". Id. at 396. 
Further, that decision directs that the expungement court should look not merely at whether an 
"arrest or conviction was in any way unlawful or invalid", but also suggests that the Court should 
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weigh whether "any other factor which could outweigh the government's interest in maintaining 
criminal records" compels expungement. Id. at 396. In other words, the Ninth Circuit directs a 
"balancing test". 
Other, earlier Fourth District Cases also have taken this broader focus. In State v. James 
Vernon Oiala, Fourth District Court Cases No. H9601116 and H9601059, the Honorable Deborah 
Bail, District Judge, expunged two valid and recorded earlier convictions because the 
appropriateness of such relief exceeded the public's interest in maintaining records even for a young 
man who had served Idaho State Penitentiary time. He had rehabilitated his life, but was precluded 
from gaining employment by the continued existence of those records. Likewise, Magistrate Judge 
Tim Hanson ordered the expungeinent of the arrest and petty larceny charges on June 26th, 1998 in 
State of Idaho v. Christo~her Williams, Case No. 85 C3950. Therein a school teacher had been 
convicted of a theft allegation some eleven years earlier, but the maintenance of the public record 
no longer served a useful purpose. 
If the entire extent of Fourth District judge's inherent authority is defined solely by the 
existing language in Koebbe, these decisions would not have been possible. Nor could a Court 
arguably be able to address a statute later found unconstitutional or a lawful arrest that was wrongly 
prosecuted. Nor could a Court review any other of a thousand "extraordinary circumstances" that 
might raise issues of great equity in favor of a movant. Therefore, Dr. Turpen urges this Court to 
use precedent from other cases to revisit and rearticulate the Koebbe case rule somewhat more 
broadly. 
111. 
THE "SERIOUS AND EXTREME CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST ANNOUNCED IN THE 
TURPEN DECISION SHOULD NOT PRECLUDE TI-IE RELIEF SOUGI-IT HEREIN 
The negative consequences reported in this record by Dr. Turpen do indeed represent severe 
impacts upon the life of a religious, civically active, law abiding, professional man. The 
accessability of an internet- interconnected world and the maintenance of public computer data base 
stations in the Ada County Courthouse present exactly the situation and threat described so aptly and 
at length, by the Colorado Supreme in Davidson below. (supra) While not amounting to a loss of 
liberty or a confiscation of property, the insult to privacy and reputation of criminal arrest and 
prosecution records without a corresponding public policy purpose is an unjustifiable damage. A 
per se or balancing test could compute the relative interest of the public and the defendant if 
expungement is recognized and a process articulated. However, to dismiss said injuries as neither 
sufficiently "serious" nor "extreme" without taking evidence thereon is legally callous. 
IV. 
IN PENNSYLVANIA AN ACQUITTED DEFENDANT IS 
AUTOMATICALLY ENTITLED TO EXPUNGEMENT 
In at least one jurisdiction, a per se rule exists entitling the defendant who is acquitted of a 
charge by ajury or judge to the automatic and complete expungement of records of all related arrests 
and proceedings. In Commonwealth v. D.M, 695 A 2d 1770 (P.A. 1997) the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania considered the circumstance of a school teacher who was tried for indecent assault and 
corrupting the morals of a minor. Mr. "D.M was acquitted afler a bench trial before a Philadelphia 
Municipal Court. The trial judge deemed both the teacher, who denied the allegation, and an eleven 
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year old girl, who asserted an inappropriate touching in the classroom, to be equally credible. 
Therefore, the case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Dismissal resulted. 
A month later, another lower court granted an expungement petition. An intermediate 
Appellate Court sustained the expungement order, distinguishing an earlier Supreme Court precedent 
which required a balancing test for expungement. Instead, the Superior Court adopted a "per se"ru1e 
mandating the affirmative granting of expungement relief after acquittal resulted at trial: 
"We must he mindful that the law offers no greater absolution 
to an accused than acquittal of the charges, and that its expunction 
of an arrest record, after being found not guilty, is not a matter of 
judicial clemency. Under these circumstances, the Court should 
not undertake to carve out exceptions to the basic proposition that 
expunction should follow acquittal. " Id. at 772 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania strongly endorsed this holding with its own 
language on review: 
"The Court has never addressed an expungement in the context of 
an acquittal. We hold, in agreement with the reasoning of the Superior 
Court, that the Wexler balancing is unnecessary, indeed inappropriate, 
when a Petitioner has been tried and acquitted. 
The problem is in attempting to apply the first factor of w- the 
strength of Commonwealth's case against the Petitioner- after a trial 
- - 
which resultcd in a verdict of acquittal. We regard it as improper to go 
behind a verdict of acquittal and purport to access the strength of the 
Prosecution's case. 
A Defendant enters a trial "in the presumption of innocence" and when 
the fact-finder reaches a verdict of acquittal, there is no justification to 
search for reasons to undermine the verdict. Such a Defendant has 
received the strongest vindication possible under our criminal tradition, 
laws, and procedures: We hold that he is entitled to expunction of the 
arrest record. 
A11 the factors listed in m r ,  and similar additional considerations 
should be evaluated in ex~unction cases which are terminated without 
conviction for reasons such as Nolle Prosequi or ARD. In cases of 
acquittal, however, we hold that a Petitioner is automatically entitled 
to the expungement of his arrest record." Id. at 772-773. 
The Pennsylvania rule is straightforward, simple, and compelling in its logic. It is not a 
unanimous nor even a majority rule, however. Unlike the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme 
Courts, many federal judges have been willing to go behind an acquittal to undertake an analysis the 
evidence. In Scrurzes v. United States, 929 F. 2d 305 (7Ih Cir. 1991) an acquittal by a jury ten years 
earlier was held not alone to be a sufficient basis to grant expungement. The reversal of a conviction 
produced a similar ruling in United States v. Janik, 10 F. 3d 470 (7Ih Cir. 1993). Likewise, when 
U.S. Attorneys have declined prosecution and thereby dismissed complaints, expungement has not 
always followed. Livingston v. United States Dewartment of Justice, 759 F. 2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
At least one Federal Court has held that the mere existence of initial probable cause to justify the 
filing o f a  complaint can preclude the granting of expungement relief. United States v. Schnitzer, 
567 F. 2d 536 (2"* Cir. 1977). 
However, while disregarding the "per sen rule of Pennsylvania, all ofthe above federal courts 
applied a balancing test to examine the government's need to maintain criminal records against the 
individuals alleged need to seek expungement. 
Dr. Turpen urges this Court consider adopting the "per sex rule ofthe Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court which would automatically compel expungement of the records sought because of the jury 
acquittal. 
v. 
ALTERNATIVELY, A "BALANCING TEST" SI-IOULD BE APPLIED TO EVALUATE 
EXPUNGEMENT REQUESTS IN IDAHO COURTS 
Both federal and state courts have articulated balancing tests by which the inherent authority 
from the Court to manage criminal justice records can consider and dispatch expungement 
Page -19- 
applications. In Davidson v. Dill, supra the Supreme Court of Colorado adopted the following rule: 
"A court should expunge an arrest record or order its retum 
when harm to the individual's right of privacy or dangers of 
unwarranted adverse consequences outweigh the public 
interest in retaining the records in police files." id. at 161 
Therein an acquitted loitering defendant sought to have fingerprints, mug shots and other 
criminal identification files expunged shortly after a jury set her free. The trial court dismissed the 
motion to expunge for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and the defendant 
appealed. The Supreme Court comprehensively recited the issues at hand in every expungeinent 
request: 
"Plaintiff in error's assignments of error are all directed to that 
court's failure to recognize her right of privacy and the alleged 
violation of this right by the failure of the police, without factual 
justification upon her acquittal, to return her arrest records to her. 
Defendants in error, on the other hand, urge that the mere retention 
by the police of an acquitted person's arrest records does not give 
rise to an actionable claim. They also argue that, in the absence of 
a statute so directing, no individual has the right to compel the return 
or expungeinent of properly obtained arrest data. 
Recent years have witnessed a substantial upsurge in the number of 
cases and commentaries dealing with the problem before this Court. 
In no small part, this phenomenon is due to the advent of the computer 
age - an event which has drastically increased the power of industry 
and government to collect data - and the growing concern for the 
individual's loss of privacy as a natural by-product of our modem 
technology. 
Present day technology and modern police investigatory procedures 
have combined to produce a situation in which the arrested individual 
has a record on file in at least one, and probably several, law enforcement 
data centers. It is common knowledge that local enforcement agencies 
are requested to forward their data pertaining to arrests to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation. The number of people affected by these practices 
is staggering . . . 
A second reason for the increased interest in the arrest record problem 
is an awareness of the economic and personal harm to an individual 
that results if his arrest becomes known to employers, credit agencies, 
or even neighbors. Notwithstanding the absence of a conviction, the 
mere record of arrest often works as a serious impediment and basis 
of discrimination in the search of employment, in securing professional 
occupational, or other licenses, and in subsequent relations with the 
police and the courts. Most employers and employment agencies 
inquire whether an applicant has been arrested. An affirmative 
answer to this question, regardless of whether a conviction resulted, 
is often sufficient to deny the applicant further consideration. 
Where there are two or more applicants for the same job, those with 
previous arrest records clearly stand in a less favorable position than 
do other applicants." 
Moreover, it is cominon knowledge that a man with an arrest record 
is much more apt to be subject to police scrutiny - the first to be 
questioned and the last eliminated as a subject in an investigation. If 
he is subsequently arrested, his arrest record may arise to haunt him in 
presentence reports, which often include not only prior convictions 
but also prior arrests. 
Prosecutors use arrest records in determining whether or not to 
formally charge an accused or even whether or not to allow a person 
to sit as a juror. And the existence of an arrest record often results in 
the denial of bail pending trial. The seriousness of the arrest record 
problem, although perhaps questionable in the past, is now too well 
documented to be doubted. 
A third impetus for the recent concern over the use of arrest records 
is the nascent recognition by our courts and legislatures that there 
exists in the individual a fundamental right of privacy- the right to be 
let alone. The parameters of this right were first extensively discussed 
in the famous law review article written in 1890 by Sainuel D. Warren 
and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193. 
Seventy-five years later, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510, 
holding for the first time that there is a constitutional right to privacy. 
The Court noted in giving substance to this right that it was dealing 
with a "right to privacy older than the Bill of Rights, so rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental." 
Id. at 158-160 (citations omitted) 
Upon this recitation of concerns for the interests of an affected and acquitted citizen, the 
Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the histoy of several state and federal court cases around the 
Country where expungement had been granted. The oldest of the cases issued relief only if a 
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petitioner could point to improper dissemination of records by the state through newspapers or other 
media. In a second group, as in Koebbe case, judges ordered expungeinent when, because of the 
impropriety of the original arrest, the records served no legitimate police function. Finally, the Court 
located and identified a most recent group of cases which it deemed to be more persuasive. Therein 
judges had "balanced individual harm against the public interest in retaining criminal justice 
records". The Colorado Supreme Court favorably cited Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334,487 P. 
2d. 21 1 (1971) for the following rule and analysis pertinent to acquitted defendants: 
"We do not mean to hold that the right of privacy an acquitted person 
has in his fingerprints and photographs is an absolute and complete 
bar to their retention. The value of fingerprints and photographs of 
an arrested person depends upon two factors: An assumption the 
individual arrested did in fact commit the crime for which he is 
accused and that his commission of this crime indicates a likelihood 
that other crimes will be committed. An acquittal seems to negate 
both premises. Where the only reason for the presence of an individual's 
fingerprints and photographs in the police file is based upon an 
arrest which has subsequently been voided by an acquittal and no 
further justification is made for the retention of these fingerprints 
and photographs, no rational basis for their retention remains. 
The courts have recognized in &Ji& and Merward that following 
an acquittal, the scales of justice required the balancing on one side 
of a plaintiffs legitimate concern over the improper use of, Labeling, 
or existence of his fingerprints, photographs, and arrest records 
against the government's bald assertion of a right to hold them. 
We have now reached the point where our experience with tlie 
requirements of a free society demands the existence of a right to 
privacy in the fingerprints and photographs of an accused who has 
been acquitted, to be at least placed in the balance, against the claiill 
to the state for a need for their retention. 
We believe the right ofan individual, absent a compelling showing 
of necessity by the government, to the return of his fingerprints and 
photographs, upon any acquittal, is a fundamental right implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty and that it is as well within the 
penumbras of tlie specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights 'formed 
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life 
and substance.' 
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"It will take a compelling showing on the part of the state to justify a 
retention of the fingerprints and photographs." Id. at 161, citing 
=at 487 P2d 214 (citation omitted) 
Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court felt strongly about imposing a balancing test for the 
consideration of expungement motions. In fact, Davidson was reversed and remanded to the trial 
court for adjudication on the merits by the conduct of a fact finding hearing to determine whether 
the precise records relief requested was appropriate and mandated on balance. Davidson, supra, at 
162. 
State courts have readily adopted the balancing test as the best device to determine the proper 
use of their inherent expungement authority. In State v. H.A, 716 N.W. 2d 360 (Minn. App. 2006) 
the Court of Appeals of Minnesota limited trial court's expungement authority to the circun~stances 
when a petitioner's constitutional rights may be seriously infringed by the retention of records, or 
when a Court determines that Court "expungement will yield a benefit to the Petitioner 
commensurate with the disadvantages to the public from the elimination ofthe record". Id. at 363. 
In crafting the latter, that appellate court listed five factors to be balanced: 
A. The extent that a Petitioner has demonstrated difficulties in securing employment 
or housing as a result of the record sought to be expunged. 
B. The seriousness and nature of the offense. 
C. The potential risk that the petitioner poses and how this effects the public's right 
to access the records. 
D. Any additional offenses orrehabilitative efforts by the Petitioner since the offense. 
E. Other objective evidence of hardship under the circumstances. 
The Court went on to say that "While we appreciate the informality of expungement 
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proceedings, we are unable to review whether a grant of denial of expullgement constitutes an abuse 
of discretion unless the District Court makes findings or determinations on the record regarding these 
factors." Id. at 364 
Ohio, likewise, imposes a balancing test even when aDefendant has been acquitted by ajury. 
Trial courts contemplating judicial expungement "should use a balancing test, which weighs the 
interest of the accused in his good name and right to be free from unwarranted punishment against 
the legitimate need of government to maintain records". In A~plication to Seal Bill of Record of 
Noble. 131 Ohio, App. 3d 399,722 N.E. 2d 602 (1999) 
Federal courts also have foulld the balancing test appropriate and useful. In Diamond v. 
United States, 649 F. 2d 496 (7Ih Cir. 198 1) the Seventh Circuit remanded to an Indiana district court 
an expungernent claim which had been sumlnarily dismissed. Diamond had been arrested on a tax 
evasion indictment some seventeen years earlier. l ie had no other arrests or convictions and that 
indictment had been dismissed upon motion of the government. Diamolld asserted that the 
maintenance of the criminal record caused an impediment to his employment. In sending the case 
back down for a hearing, the Appellate court recognized that an individual has a compelling interest 
ill a "clean" record: 
"In conclusion, we approve the case by case approach. . . 
'In each case, the court must weigh the reasons advanced for 
and against expunging arrest records' . . . 
If the dangers of unwarranted adverse consequences to the 
individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the 
records, then expunction is appropriate. Such an approach 
behooves the district court to develop a complete factual 
record. . . In this case, such a record is lacking. At this 
point, we can not say that Diamond can prove no set of facts which 
would entitle him to relief. . . The Government has presented 
no reasons while maintaining a record of Diamond's arrest. 
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On the other hand, Diamond has alleged facts indicating that 
his encounter with the criminal justice system was an aberration. 
In these days of employer awareness of high recidivism, this 
truly may present an "unusual" or "extreme" case in which the 
extraordinary relief Diamond requests is appropriate so that his 
employment will not be unfairly refused. 
The Government should be required to state why the indictment 
against Diamond was dismissed on its motion and why it is 
necessary to maintain this seventeen-year-old rap sheet. If he 
is to be denied this relief, a district court judge must give his reasons 
therefor. Absent valid reasons Diamond should be permitted to 
prevail." Id. at 499. (citations omitted) 
Thus, the Appellant urges this Court to also articulate a balancing test for the State of Idaho 
consistent with his rights and this Court's inherent equitable authority. Only by such a test can all 
combinations of comparative public and private equities be considered. An invalid arrest is only one 
of a thousand possible circumstances which could merit expungement. Such a properly developed 
procedure will allow Dr. Turpen on this record, and others similarly situated, whether recently 
acquitted or long ago convicted, to present and prevail in expungement motions where the public 
interest in record maintenance is outweighed by extraordinary circun~stances. 
EXPUNGEMENT ALSO HAS CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS n\r IDAHO 
As noted above, the courts of a number of jurisdictions have stated that expungement 
applications which address the maintenance of criminal records also raise privacy protection issues 
under the United States Constitution. Griswald v. Comlecticut, supra. Article I, Section 18 of the 
Idaho Constitution provides that "courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy 
remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character" 
The Affidavit in Support of Dr. Turpen and his supplemental letter (R41-46 and E5 letter) 
to the judge detail precisely just such an "injury of person, property or character." I-Ie seelts the 
"speedy remedy" through an order to expunge. Damages are caused to Dr. Turpen by the 
maintenance of these court records. I-Ie experiences both a loss of income in his business and an 
inability to attend religious services at the penitentiary. These constitute bath "property" and 
"liberty" interests of a constitutional dimension. 
This Appellant believes that the mandate for speedy and open justice requires Idaho judges 
to recognize and utilize their inherent power to expunge criminal justice records, if the continued 
maintenance of those records is of little public value and creates an injury of person, property, or 
character. Thus, Dr. Turpen urges this flonorable Court to conclude and opine that expungement 
in Idaho carries both an equitable and constitutional basis for relief. Article I, Section 18 of the 
Idaho Constitution has been held not to create any new substantive rights. Hawlev v. Green, 1 17 
Idaho 498,788 P. 2d 1321 (1990). However, liberty interests and property rights flowing from both 
the United States Constitution and the provisions of the Idaho Constitution should be enforced 
through the due process guarantees in Idaho of our Article I, Section 13 as to expungement relief. 
This Court should so hold. 
VII. 
THIS APPELLANT PRESENTS EXTRAORDINARY 
CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING RELIEF 
As detailed in the record herein, and as discernable from the transcript of the trial below, the 
sexual misconduct by a medical provider allegations were unproved and unprovable before a duly 
constituted Ada County jury. The Idaho Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Investigation 
Division and related F.B.I. record erasures, done pursuant to Idaho statute, provide only partial relief. 
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Dr. Turpen had no prior criminal record when he was accused of this crime. He has led an 
exemplary and uncharged life subsequently. He has obtained the highest form of release and 
endorsement for one charged with any crime- a jury acquittal. Yet local authorities, including the 
Fourth District Court and its clerk, continue to maintain records which constitute a unwarranted 
threat, injury and damage to Dr. Turpen's personal comfort, financial security, civic volunteerism 
and the continued operation of his business. Without expungement, these records, especially 
including Exhibit " B ,  hereto remain an embarrassment and blot upon Dr. Turpen's exemplary 
citizenship. 
Because these allegations were unproved, there is no compelling public interest in 
maintaining the same. By no factual assertion has the State presented evidence ofa continued public 
safety or other interest to justify their existence. Upon this record and under these circumstances, 
Dr. Turpen is a properly situated citizen to seek and receive the expungement relief sought herein. 
CONCLIJSION 
For each and all of the above stated reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests that this 
Court reconfirm the inherent authority ofthe judiciary to consider expungement relief, to distinguish, 
define and expand the holdings of the Fourtll District Court to co~~template a wider range of facts, 
and to reverse the Order below dismissing the motion to expunge and to grant or to remand for the 
relief sought hereby. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
DATED This \Zlk day of June, 2008. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certi& that on this _1_$_ day of June, 2008, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief On Appeal to Reverse Denial of Motion To Expunge to be sent by U.S. Mail to the 
following: 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
Defendant. 
CaseNo. H05  01216 
DECISION ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff moved to expunge his record from all indicia of what he contends to have 
been an unjustified arrest and criminal prosecution. The magistrate denied the motion 
upon the grounds that there was no legal authority in Idaho for the relief requested. 
Plaintiffappealed. The State indicated that it was taking no position in the matter. The 
issues are submitted on the moving papers. 
Research on this issue is confounded by confusion over circumstances where a 
defendant is properly charged and later seeks to clear his name by an expungment. The 
statutes i r~  Idaho seem to pertain to such circumstances. LC. § 20-525A relates to the 
expungemeat ofjuvenile records upon cbnditions stated. LC. 5 19-2604 pertains to 
reducing charges upon successfu:l completion of probation. LC. $67-3004(10) provides 
that under certain circumstances, one may have fingerprint records removed from the 
E X  14 
Decision on Appeal Page -- 1 
Department of Law Enforcement data banks if formal charges are not filed within one 
year of an arrest. These statutes do not seem to provide the relief requested, since all 
seem to contemplate that the initial proceedings were justified and that some indicia of 
the record should remain, just in case the individual crosses the line again. 
There is no specific statutory authority for expunging a record upon the claim that 
the very proceedings from the outset were unjustified. However, the courts have inherent 
jurisdiction, under the equitable power of the court, to right a wrong if such can be 
established. Here, the plaintiff ciaims that the arrest was wrong and uljustified &om the 
outset. If such can be established, the court has the inherent power to right the wrong, and 
order appropriate remedy to eradicate the taint of the arrest and subsequent proceedings 
&om the recorded history of the plaintiff in the records of law enforcement. 
The application is addressed to the equitable power of the court. The showing 
required is that the police action giving rise to the creation of the "record" was unjustified 
from the outset, and that it would be unjust and inequitable for the "record" to continue. 
A hearing is required. 
The order of the magistra1.e dismissing the application is reversed. The matter is 
remanded for consideration by the magistrate, under the inherent equitable power of the 
court, whether a wrong was done to this plaintiff that, in equity, should be rectified; and 
if so, to fashion an appropriate equitable order to achieve that end. 
It is so ordered. 
Dated thi a* day of March, 2006. 
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